<u>Liontrust Policy – United Kingdom (FTSE 350) and Ireland</u> (ISEQ20) Proxy Voting Guidelines

We actively vote across the UK FTSE 350 and companies listed in Ireland's ISEQ20 as an extension of our engagement and to signal support or concerns about a company's practices and proposals.

We recognise that companies are not homogeneous and some variation in governance structures and practice is to be expected. Reflecting the need for some practical flexibility, corporate governance models are increasingly operating on a "comply or explain" basis, which is an approach we are supportive of.

In making our final voting decisions we seek to have regard to any company specific context and clarifications, as well as local market standards. Within practical limits we aim, where possible, to raise issues of concern and engage with companies ahead of the General Meeting. Our core holdings are prioritised in this regard.

This policy forms the basis of vote recommendations for companies listed in the United Kingdom and Ireland. It will also be applied to companies incorporated in other territories such as the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey, and which are either listed in the UK and Ireland or on the Channel Islands Securities Exchange.

Voting Issue	Liontrust Policy	Vote Recommendations
Financial Statements and Statutory Reports (M0105)	We may withhold support from the Report & Accounts in certain instances including the following:	
	Where adequate disclosure has not been provided.	Against where adequate disclosure has not been provided (e.g. annual report not disclosed in time).
	Where the auditor has emphasised a matter or where the auditor has provided a qualified opinion.	Abstain where auditor has emphasised a matter in its opinion.
		Against where the auditor has qualified their opinion.
Appointment of Auditors and Auditor Fees (M0101, M0109,M0136)	We hold that the Audit Committee should pay particular attention to the provision of non-audit services by the external auditor.	Against if a big 4 auditor and if non-audit fees are more than 33% of audit fees.
	Where non-audit services have been provided by the auditor, we will consider carefully both the actual value of non-audit services provided as well as the ratio between the audit and non-audit fees.	
		Abstain if big 4 auditor and excessive non-audit fees are more than 33% of audit fees and an adequate explanation is given.
		Abstain if outside big 4 auditors and if non-audit fees are more than £500,000 (or market equivalent) or are more than 33% of audit fees.

Against if outside big 4 auditors and if excessive non-audit fees of five consecutive years and more than 33% of audit fees.

Rotation of auditors:

Abstain if after 10 years and where the company have indicated that they are in the process of an audit tender with the intention of rotating the audit firm or have stated their intention to rotate their auditor in the upcoming financial year.

Against after ten years and there is no intention to rotate the Auditor in the upcoming financial year.

We will take into consideration on a case-by-case basis the circumstances where there are serious concerns about the effectiveness of the auditors; the auditors are being changed without explanation; or the lead audit partner(s) has been linked with a significant auditing controversy.

Abstain if there are serious concerns about the effectiveness of the auditors; the auditors are being changed without explanation; or the lead audit partner(s) has been linked with a significant auditing controversy.

Company Boards (M0201) – Director Elections

We expect at least half the board excluding the Chair should comprise Non-Executive Directors determined by the Board to be independent.

We expect directors to be able to dedicate sufficient time to the role. We will vote against any director that we feel is overboarded. Any person who holds more than five mandates at listed companies will be classified as overboarded. For the purposes of calculating this limit, a non-executive directorship counts as one mandate, a non-executive Chairship counts as two mandates, and a position as executive

Against if non-independent NED and Board is less than 50% independent.

Against if a Director is considered overboarded.

Defined as follows:

Any person who holds more than five mandates at listed companies will be classified as overboarded. For the purposes of calculating this limit, a non-executive directorship counts as one mandate, a nondirector (or a comparable role) is counted as three mandates.

Also, any person who holds the position of executive director (or a comparable role) at one company and a non-executive Chair at a different company will be classified as overboarded.

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Also, any person who holds the position of executive director (or a comparable role) at one company and a non-executive Chair at a different company will be classified as overboarded.

When applying this policy, we will consider the nature and scope of the various appointments and the companies concerned, and if any exceptional circumstances exist. A stricter view may apply for directors who serve on the boards of complex companies, those in highly regulated sectors, or directors who chair a number of key committees.

CEOs and Chairmen

An adverse vote recommendation will not be applied to a director within a company where he/she serves as CEO; instead, any adverse vote recommendations will be applied to his/her additional seats on other company boards.

For chairmen, negative recommendations would first be applied towards non-executive positions held but the chair position itself would be targeted where they are being elected as Chair for the first time or, when in aggregate their chair positions are three or more in number, or if the Chair holds an outside executive position.

Abstain if there are serious concerns of

election of individual directors for: > Material failures of governance, stewardship, or risk oversight; or > Egregious actions related to the director(s)'service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about that individual's ability to effectively oversee that individual's ability to effectively oversee stewardship, or risk oversight; or > Egregious actions related to the director(s)'service raise substantial doubt about that individual's ability to effectively oversee			I
Nomination Committee – Diversity – Gender & Ethnicity For standard and premium listed companies, ISS may consider recommending against the chair of the nomination committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) if the company has not met the reporting requirements of the FCA Listing Rules, which require boards to meet the following targets: At least 40% of the board are women; and At least one of the senior board positions (Chair, CEO, Senior Independent Director or CFO) is a woman. In respect of ISEQ 20 constituents and AIMI-listed companies with a market capitalisation of over GBP 500 million, ISS will generally recommend against the chair of the nomination committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) if there is not at least one woman on the board. Mitigating factors include: Compliance with the relevant board diversity standard at the preceding AGM and a firm commitment, publicly available, to comply with the relevant standard within a year. Other relevant factors as applicable.		> Material failures of governance, stewardship, or risk oversight; or > Egregious actions related to the director(s)'service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about that individual's ability to effectively oversee management and to serve the best interests of	Egregious actions related to the director(s)'service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about that individual's ability to effectively oversee
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a year. Other relevant factors as applicable.			
Other relevant factors as applicable.			
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Gender diversity – Leadership		Other relevant factors as applicable.	
			Gender diversity – Leadership

Gender diversity - Leadership

Vote against the Chair of the Nomination Committee where leadership teams at FTSE 100 companies are under 33% women and abstain where 33-40%. ('Leadership' teams' are defined by ISS' 'senior leadership' data which includes the company's executive committee and their direct reports)

Ethnic/racial diversity

For standard and premium listed companies, ISS may consider recommending against the chair of the nomination committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) if the company has not met the relevant reporting requirement of the FCA Listing Rules, which require boards to confirm that at least one member of the board is from a minority ethnic background.

Mitigating factors include:

- Compliance with the relevant board diversity standard at the preceding AGM and a firm commitment, publicly available, to comply with the relevant standard within a year.
- Other relevant factors as applicable.

In respect of ISEQ 20 constituents and AIM-listed companies with a market capitalisation of over GBP 500 million, ISS will generally recommend against the chair of the nomination committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) if such companies have not appointed at least one individual from an ethnic minority background to the board by 2024.

Against if the leadership team is under 33% women.

Abstain if the leadership team is between 33-40% women.

Ethnic/racial diversity

In line with ISS

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Election of CEO/Chair	We hold that a Chair should be an independent non- executive director on appointment.	Against if a Chair is being elected for the first time and Chair is non-independent on
	However, once appointed a Chair will no longer be	appointment.
	considered either independent or non-independent.	For if all subsequent proposals to elect a
	·	non-executive Chair.
	We will take into consideration on a case-by-case	
	basis the election of a former CEO as Chair or the	Against if an Executive Chair unless an
	election of an Executive Chair.	adequate explanation is given.
	We will consider the re-election of the chair on a case-	Against where the Chair's tenure exceeds
	by-case basis, taking into account such factors as	11 years from the date of their first
	succession planning, diversity, and board	appointment to the board.
	independence, in addition to tenure.	
	We will vote Against where a Company is seeking the	Against if there is a combined CEO/Chair.
	election of a combined CEO and Chair.	
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Audit, Remuneration and Nomination Committees	The audit committee should comprise at least three non-executive directors, and all members should be	Against if non-independent NED on Audit or Remuneration Committee.
Nomination Committees	independent. The company Chair should not be a	of Remandration committee.
	member of the audit committee.	
	The remuneration committee should also comprise at	Against if an Executive Director on Audit or Remuneration Committee.
	least three non-executive directors and again, all members should be independent. In addition, the	Remuneration Committee.
	company Chair may also be a member, but not chair,	
	of the remuneration committee if he or she was	
	considered independent on appointment as Chair.	
	A majority of the nomination committee should	Against if the nomination committee
	consist of independent non-executive directors.	consists of less than 50% independent non-
	·	executive directors.
Share Plans (M0501,	Apply ISS guidelines	Against – where ISS Vote Against
M0503, M0507, M0509)		Abstain – where ISS Vote Abstain
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Remuneration Report (M0550) / Remuneration Policy	Apply ISS guidelines	Against – where ISS Vote Against Abstain – where ISS Vote Abstain
Share Issuances/Capital Structure (M0329/M0331/M0300s)	We will vote in line with recommended best practice on general share issuance requests and will consider on a case-by-case basis for specific requests.	Against if the aggregate issue with preemptive rights exceeds 66.6 percent of the issued share capital (33.3 percent for general issue and 33.3 percent for rights issue).
	In line with the Pre-Emption Group Principles, the routine authority to disapply pre-emption rights exceeds 20 percent of the issued share capital, provided that any amount above 10 percent is to be used for the purposes of an acquisition or a specified capital investment. For the general disapplication authority and specific disapplication authority, a further disapplication of up to 2 percent may be used for each authority for the purposes of a follow-on offer.	Against if the routine authority to disapply preemption rights exceeds 20 percent of the issued share capital, or if the amount above 10 percent is not used for the purposes of an acquisition or a specified capital investment. For the general disapplication authority and specific disapplication authority, a further disapplication of up to 2% may be used for each authority for the purposes of a follow-on offer.
Organisational/Structure /M&A (M0400s)	We will evaluate on a case-by-case basis on all Company structure related items including reorganisations, mergers, acquisitions, related party transactions and any bid waivers.	In line with ISS
Political Donations (M0163)	We do not support the paying of political donations however we will support the payment of approved political donations only under circumstances used to comply with EU regulation.	Against resolutions to provide for the company to be able to pay political donations if political donations have been made or duration is greater than 15 months.
Fix Maximum Variable Compensation Ratio (M0571)	We will consider on a case-by-case basis remuneration policies in the overall context of executive pay.	Against resolutions which breach local best practice.

Climate Change	We will consider on a case-by-case basis:	
	,	

In line with ISS on the topics below – Use ISS rationale:

- Mergers & Acquisitions
- Related Party Transactions
- Mandatory Takeover Bid Waivers
- Reincorporation Proposals
- Shareholder Proposals
- Other non-routine items/controversial items.

Climate Change: Where Liontrust deem corporate disclosures and/or management actions on climate change risk to be adequately insufficient or the company fails to be proactive in communicating their strategy for reducing carbon emissions, we may withhold support from the re-election of directors or other related proposals.

Other ESG disclosures: Where Liontrust deem corporate disclosures and/or management actions on other ESG risk to be adequately insufficient and following failed engagement with management in these specific matters, on the discretion of the fund manager we may withhold support from the re-election of directors or other related proposals.

Appendix:

Our Definition of Non-Independent Director:

- Significant shareholder (over 1% of Company)
- An employee or executive of the company
- Currently provides professional services to the company
- Has a senior role at one of the Company's advisers
- Relative of executive (or former executive) or senior employee
- Founder/co-founder/member of founding family
- Former executive (five year cooling off period)
- Has been on the board for more than 9 years
- Has had within the last 3 years, a material business relationship with the company
- Conflicting or cross directorship with executive directors or the Chair of the Company